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The drastic reform of the economic system has provided great benefits for former socialist 
states. Despite remarkable economic growth in recent years, however, these countries are 
facing some grave social issues. Above all, the spread of corruption throughout all aspects 
of civil life is regarded as one of the most serious problems. The significance of corruption 
in the former communist bloc is clearly shown in objective assessments by third parties. In 
fact, according to the World Bank (2007), only eight of 34 transitional countries exceed the 
world average of the Control of Corruption Index, and most of the remaining 26 countries 
fall much below it. 
In  Table 1, using panel data for the period 1996-2006 covering 202 countries 
throughout the world, we regressed the Control of Corruption Index to a dummy 
variable(s), which assigns a value of 1 to transitional countries or to a specific group of 
them, controlling GDP per capita and its quadratic value.
1  As shown in the table, the extent 
of corruption control in former socialist states deviates downward when compared to the 
trend of the whole world, even after considering the economic development level of these 
countries. Moreover, the table clearly indicates that a noticeable difference in the degree of 
corruption has arisen among transitional countries themselves. 
The above findings are closely related to the fact that these countries are still in the 
transition from a planned system to a market economy. However, the determinants of 
corruption in transition economies have been investigated on the macro level in only a few 
studies. In addition, as reported later, the preceding studies have some shortcomings that 
need to be overcome. In this paper, we examine this issue through the estimation of a new 
empirical model using the Control of Corruption Index for 32 transitional countries as the 
dependent variable. 
The next section considers various factors that can affect the corruption level in 
transition economies and discuss the remaining issues of previous research. Section 3 
describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the estimation results. 
Section 5 summarizes the major findings and concludes the paper. 
 
                                                           
1 In general, the corruption level tends to decline along with the development of a national 
economy and increasing income levels. It is argued, however, that the marginal effect in which 
economic development controls corruption gradually diminishes. Accordingly, we predict that the 
estimates of GDP per capita and its quadratic value have a positive and a negative sign, 
respectively.  Corruption in Transition Economies 
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2. Literature review and remaining issues 
The determinants of corruption, confirmed by preceding studies with high statistical 
significance, are divided broadly into three categories, namely, economic, political, and 
cultural, in accordance with the classification of La Porta et al. (1999). Among them, the 
variables that can be applied to the empirical analysis of transition economies in each 
category are discussed below. 
The economic factors include the economic development level measured by GDP per 
capita and the degree of marketization expressed by the extent of economic freedom and 
the openness of trade (e.g., Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Gurger and Shah, 2005). In addition, 
official development aid (ODA) and public works are regarded as factors that trigger 
corruption because these policies tend to foster a cozy relationship between political and 
business circles (e.g., Ali and Isse, 2003; Dreher et al., 2004). 
The political factors cover the rule of law, political democratization, and the degree of 
administrative centralization (e.g., Alt and Lassen, 2003; Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003). With 
regard to the impact of administrative centralization on corruption, it is noteworthy that 
decentralization may work as a corruption control factor because it depresses the 
cost-benefit performance of corruption for bribe payers. Meanwhile, there is an argument 
according to which the streamlining of administrative organizations that accompanies 
decentralization tends to promote personal connections between bureaucrats and 
businesspersons and the decentralization of police organizations weakens enforceability and 
increases corruption (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1994; Damania et al., 2004). Indeed, the 
empirical results on this point are mixed. In any case, the administrative centralization is one 
of the critical issues in this research field, and, hence, it is worth examining its impact on the 
corruption level in the context of a transition economy. 
The third category is the cultural factor. Treisman (2000) argues that the share of the 
Protestant population in a country is negatively associated with the country’s corruption 
level. This is because criticism of public authorities by citizens is not as easily made in a 
hierarchical religious society where the Catholic church or the Islamic religious authority is 
dominant as in an egalitarian religious society where the Protestant church has historically 
played a role as a countervailing power exercising surveillance over a state. Basing on this 
notion, we examine the corruption control effect arising from a difference in the dominant 
religion. 
Next, from the viewpoint of the study on transition economies, we specify the issues Corruption in Transition Economies 
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examined in this paper: The number of studies that have examined the determinants of 
corruption focusing on macro-level factors in transition economies is limited, namely, to 
those by Broadman and Recanatini (2000, 2002) and Abed and Davoodi (2000). In addition, 
however, these studies contain four problems enumerated here. First, they use a small 
dataset. Secondly, the specification of the regression model is insufficient. Thirdly, the 
statistical robustness of the estimation results has not been thoroughly examined. Finally, as 
the subjects of empirical analysis are limited to the former Soviet Union and Central and 
Eastern Europe, there may be some regional bias in the empirical results. We attempt to 
overcome these remaining issues by introducing all of the above discussed potential factors 
of corruption into the right-hand side of the regression equation and by estimating the 
model using long-term panel data covering almost all transition economies worldwide. 
 
3. Data and empirical methodology 
Following the empirical strategy discussed in the previous section, we use panel data for 32 
transition economies in the regions of Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet 
Union, and Asia.
2 The observation period covers nine years from 1998 through 2006. The 
data consist of 224 country-year observations. 
We use the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index as the dependent variable of 
the regression model. As independent variables, we adopt nine variables representing either 
political, economic, or cultural factors that may affect the corruption level in a transitional 
country. They include three policy indices reflecting the degree of (a) marketization, (b) rule 
of law, and (c) democratization, all of which are essential reform measures to achieve the 
transition to a market economy; (d) a comprehensive index of the transformation policy that 
assesses overall progress of the above three reform measures; (e) GDP per capita; (f) the 
quadratic value of GDP per capita; (g) the net inflow of ODA; (h) the construction 
industry’s share of GDP, as a proxy for the scale of domestic public works; (i) a dummy 
variable that assigns a value of 1 to countries with the federal government system; and (j) 
the Protestant population share. In addition to these variables, we also employ (k) the 
duration of socialism
3 and (l) transitional country group variables, as shown in Table 1, as 
control variables. To avoid a simultaneous bias problem, we lag all four policy variables, 
                                                           
2  Only Kosovo and Montenegro are excluded due to a lack of data. 
3  This variable is divided by the number of years elapsed from the start of transition in considering 
the possibility that the institutional inertia effect of the old regime decays with the passage of time. Corruption in Transition Economies 
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GDP per capita, its quadratic value, net inflow of ODA, and construction industry’s share 
of GDP for one year, to utilize them as predetermined variables. 
  Basically, we use the random-effects estimator and pooling OLS estimator to perform 
panel regression because the estimation equation contains time-invariant variables on its 
right-hand side. For a robustness check, however, we report the best estimation result 
according to the model specification test of three panel estimators, including the 
fixed-effects estimator.
4 To avoid the impact of the Protestant population share, which is 
also a time-invariant variable that becomes unestimatable due to the selection of a 
fixed-effects model, the interaction terms between policy indices and Protestant share are 
introduced to the estimate equation. 
In accordance with the discussions and empirical evidence of the preceding studies, 
we expect that the policy variables, the Protestant population share, its interaction terms 
with a policy variable, and GDP per capita positively correlate to the extent of corruption 
control and, in contrast, the net inflow of ODA, the construction industry share, the 
adoption of a federal government system, and the quadratic value of GDP per capita relate 
negatively to the extent of corruption control. The duration of socialism is expected to be 
negatively associated with the extent of corruption control because the longer the planned 
economy is implemented, the more the collusive relationship between the state and 
enterprises is strengthened, and, consequently, the more difficult it is to sweep away the cozy 
relationships among political and business establishments in the transition period. If the 
corruption difference among former socialist states is sufficiently explained by these 
independent variables, the transitional country group variables cannot be estimated with 
statistical significance. 
 
4. Estimation results 
The estimation results are reported in Table 2. The models from [1] to [5] are those 
including the transitional country group variables, and the models from [6] to [11] are those 
                                                           
4 Assuming the one-way model, which controls only country-level individual effects, and the 
two-way model, which pays attention to the existence of time fixed-effects as options to perform 
panel regression as well, we first specify the form of individual effects according to the results of 
F test, Hausman test, and the Breush-Pagan test. The model to be estimated is then determined by 
the result of the F test concerning the selection of the one-way fixed-effects model and the 
two-way fixed-effects model. If the model cannot be specified to one even after this procedure, we 
report the estimation results of both one-way and two-way models. Corruption in Transition Economies 
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not including them on the right-hand side of the estimation equation. The former five 
models are designed to examine how much the difference among transitional country 
groups at a corruption level can be explained by independent variables. The latter six models 
that are estimated by the best method, including the fixed-effects estimator according to the 
model specification test, aim to check the statistical robustness of independent variables. 
Each model shows a very high value of the determination coefficient adjusted for the 
degrees of freedom (Adj.R
2). It can be ascertained that each model sufficiently explains the 
dispersion of the extent of corruption control of transitional countries. 
As Table 2 shows, under all model specifications, every policy variable is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% or lower level. This strongly suggests that the promotion of 
marketization, rule of law, and democratization as well as the comprehensive progress of 
these three policy measures produce a very strong control effect on corruption activities in 
transition economies. In three models, the interaction terms between policy indices and the 
Protestant population share are estimated with a positive sign at the 10% or less significant 
level, indicating that a national policy for establishing a market-oriented economy and an 
egalitarian religious society are in a mutually institutional complementary relationship for the 
prevention of corruption. 
Among other independent variables, GDP per capita and its quadratic value are 
significantly estimated to be positive and negative, respectively, in line with our expectations 
in many models. The federal government system dummy variable is estimated to be negative 
and significant at the 5% or lower level, except for Models [4] and [5]. We conjecture that 
the concentration of administrative functions into the central government under systemic 
transformation has secondary effects to raise the corruption level of the whole nation. 
Although the construction industry’s share of GDP is significantly estimated in four models, 
its coefficient shows a positive sign contrary to our expectation. Among control variables, 
the duration of socialism is negatively estimated at the 10% or lower level in five models. 
This result demonstrates that the stronger the institutional inertia of the communist regime 
is, the more difficult it will be to mitigate corruption in the transition period. 
In contrast to Model [1], which contains only GDP per capita and its quadratic value 
on the right-hand side of the estimate equation, the statistical significance of the transitional 
country group variables notably declines in regression models to which policy indices and 
other independent variables are introduced. In particular, in Models [4] and [5], which 
capture the policy progress of each country by using the democratization policy variable or 
the comprehensive index of the transformation policy, all the transitional country group Corruption in Transition Economies 
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variables are estimated insignificant. In addition, the statistical significance of policy indices 
largely surpasses that of other independent variables. We interpret these results as evidence 
that the remarkable differences in corruption control arising among transitional countries 
can be explained by disparities in the democratization impetus and comprehensive policy 
capacity of the government. We also believe that this factor is the central reason for the 
upward deviation of the corruption level of transitional countries from the world trend, 
which is reported in the Introduction. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we empirically examined the determinants of corruption in former socialist 
states by using panel data covering almost all transition economies in the world. As a result, 
we obtained the following evidence. First, there is a strong positive relationship between 
corruption control and the progress of systemic transformation policy. Secondly, the 
coupling of an egalitarian religious society and policy measures aimed at systemic 
transformation to a market economy exerts a mutually complementing prevention effect on 
corruption. Thirdly, a centralized administrative system can become a hotbed of corruption. 
Finally, the stronger the institutional inertia (or historical path-dependency) of the 
communist regime is, the more serious the corruption problems are in a country. These 
empirical results lead to the political implication that fundamental structural reforms are 
very effective in preventing corruption in transitional countries. 
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Independent variable: Control of Corruption Index
 a
Degree of economic development












All transitional countries -0.282
***
(-2.90)
















CIS member countries -0.680
***
(-4.56)
European CIS member countries -0.592
**
(-2.36)
Central Asian and Caucasian CIS member countries -0.723
***
(-4.02)





N 1528 1528 1528
Adj. R
2 0.504 0.518 0.519
b Default category is non former socialist transitional countries.
c Including China.
Source: Authors' estimation. Original sources of the Control of Corruption Index and GDP per capita (unit: 10,000
US dollars) are from the World Bank (2007) and the United Nations' public data, respectively.
a The Control of Corruption Index covers more than 200 countries in the world. The index measures the degree to
which public power is exercised to obtain personal gain and is processed so that 99% of data falls within the range
from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best).
Notes: All models are estimated using the two-way random-effects estimator. The estimation period is from 1996
through 2006. Constant terms are not reported for brevity. The figures in parentheses are the t value. ***, **, and *
indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Non-EU member countries in Southern and
Eastern Europe as of 2004
Central and Eastern Europe countries newly
joining the EU in 2004
Panel regression analysis of the divergence in the level of corruption of transitional countries
from the world trend
Non-EU member countries in Southern and
Eastern Europe
[1] [2] [3]Table 2
Panel regression analysis on the determinants of corruption in transition economies
Independent variable: Control of Corruption Index
Policy variables
 a


















Policy index × Protestant population share (+) -0.0002 0.002 0.016
* 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.023
** 0.013 0.010
** 0.002
(-0.03) (0.32) (1.73) (1.32) (0.56) (1.34) (2.19) (1.47) (2.18) (0.67)
Other economic, political, and cultural factor variables






* 0.243 0.269 0.986
*** 0.070 0.905
***
(4.13) (3.95) (3.32) (3.41) (2.81) (1.74) (0.99) (1.10) (4.64) (0.28) (-4.43)
GDP per capita (quadratic value) (-) -0.355
*** -0.313
** -0.199 -0.234
* -0.185 -0.159 -0.075 -0.118 -0.289
** -0.037 -0.269
**
(-2.82) (-2.13) (-1.51) (-1.72) (-1.39) (-1.05) (-0.53) (-0.83) (-2.30) (-0.26) (-2.22)
Net inflow of ODA (-) 0.064 0.062 0.066 0.054 0.020 0.026 -0.014 0.057 -0.001 0.049
(1.36) (1.64) (1.58) (1.33) (0.33) (0.46) (-0.25) (1.39) (-0.02) (1.25)
Construction industry's share of GDP (-) 0.009





(1.74) (1.61) (1.44) (1.43) (2.12) (2.38) (2.14) (1.45) (2.25) (1.42)










(-3.12) (-2.23) (-1.46) (-1.82) (-3.54) (-3.49) (-2.04) (-2.03) (-2.41) (-2.06)
Control variables
Protestant population share (+) 0.006 0.004 -0.011 -0.009 ―― ― -0.005 ― -0.001
(0.53) (0.91) (-1.11) (-0.84) ―― ― (-0.54) ― (-0.06)
Duration of socialism (-) -0.008 -0.023
* -0.040
*** -0.020
* 0.008 -0.008 -0.001 -0.048
*** 0.001 -0.027
***
(-0.53) (-1.91) (-3.13) (-1.65) (0.92) (-1.03) (-0.07) (-4.95) (0.09) (-2.88)
Transitional country group variables
 b
0.337
** 0.217 0.059 0.125 0.111
(2.21) (1.43) (0.53) (0.95) (0.89)
-0.305
** -0.170 -0.101 -0.126 -0.082
(-1.98) (-1.23) (-1.06) (-1.08) (-0.73)
Baltic countries 0.406
** 0.158 0.124 0.201 0.106
(2.37) (0.93) (1.05) (1.40) (0.77)




(-3.55) (-2.08) (-2.00) (-1.07) (-1.28)




(-4.35) (-2.95) (-2.53) (-0.84) (-1.45)




(-2.12) (-1.56) (-2.31) (-0.46) (-1.03)
N 224 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213
Adj. R
2 0.788 0.812 0.876 0.859 0.867 0.952 0.957 0.957 0.847 0.960 0.864
Notes: Constant terms are not reported here for brevity. The estimation period is from 1998 through 2006. The figures in parentheses are the  t value. ***, **, and * indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
b Default category is countries newly joining the EU in 2007.
c Including China.
fixed-effects random-effects Estimation method
One-way
Central and Eastern Europe countries newly joining the
EU in 2004
Non-EU member countries in Southern and Eastern
Europe
fixed-effects random-effects
a The policy indices of marketization, rule of law, and democratization are processed so that 99% of data falls within the range from -2.5 (no progress at all) to 2.5 (sufficient progress). The comprehensive index of transformation policy is the first principal component of











Two-way One-way Two-way Two-way
random-effects
Source: Authors' estimation. The original sources of variables used for the estimation are as follows: the Control of Corruption index, policy indices of marketization, rule of law, and democratization are from the World Bank (2007); the GDP per capita (unit: 10,000 US
dollars) and construction industry's share of the GDP are calculated by the authors based on public data of the United Nations; the net inflow of ODA (unit: 1 billion dollars) is from the World Bank (2008); and the Protestant population share is from the CIA (2008) and
La Porta et al. (1999). Other variables are set by the authors.
[3] [4] [5] [6] [11] [7] [10]
One-way
fixed-effects